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THE PRICE OF CONFLICT: WAR, TAXES, AND
THE POLITICS OF FISCAL CITIZENSHIPt
Ajay K. Mehrotra*
WAR AND TAXES. By Steven A. Bank, Kirk J. Stark, and Joseph J. Thorndike.
Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press. 2008. Pp. xix, 224. $26.50.
INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2003, Congress was in the midst of drafting a new tax
bill. Two years earlier, the Bush Administration and congressional leaders
had initiated a tax-cutting agenda by slashing individual income tax rates
and reducing wealth-transfer taxes.' The 2003 bill was an attempt to con-
tinue the assault on the nation's progressive tax structure, just as the budget
deficit was spiraling out of control.2 Meanwhile, the "war on terror" was in
full swing. By the end of April 2003, well over 135,000 U.S. troops were
deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq, and military spending was escalating at
an alarming rate.3 The continued commitment to tax cuts during wartime
seemed incongruous. How could lawmakers consider tax cuts, aimed mainly
at the wealthy, at a time when many ordinary Americans were sacrificing
life and limb overseas? To explain the apparent dissonance, then-House
Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-TX) boldly declared that, "Nothing is more
important in the face of a war than cutting taxes.'A
DeLay's remark was not mere political rhetoric. Just one month later, he
followed through by joining his fellow House Republicans in passing a
package of tax cuts that the Congressional Budget Office estimated would
t © 2009 Ajay K. Mehrotra, all rights reserved.
* Professor of Law & Louis F Niezer Faculty Fellow, Adjunct Associate Professor of
History, Co-Director, Center for Law, Society & Culture, Indiana University Maurer School of
Law-Bloomington. Thanks to Chris Capozzola, Steve Conrad, Mary Dudziak, Dan Ernst, Leandra
Lederman, Amanda Meglemre, Bill Popkin, Joel Slemrod, Nancy Staudt, Dennis Ventry, and the
students in my Tax Policy course for their comments and suggestions. And to Collin McCready for
outstanding research assistance, and the editors and staff of the Michigan Law Review for all their
help. This Review expands on an earlier and shorter book review published in the Washington
Monthly. Ajay K. Mehrotra, Pay To Win: Raising taxes during wartime has never been fun. Why
other presidents did it, WASH. MONTHLY, Aug./Sept./Oct. 2008, at 51.
I. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38.
2. See David E. Rosenbaum, White House Sees a $455 Billion Gap in the '03 Budget:
Would Be Biggest U.S. Deficit-Democrats Point to Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at Al.
3. Vernon Loeb, U.S. Military Will Leave Saudi Arabia This Year, WASH. POST, Apr. 30,
2003, at Al.
4. Editorial, The Budget Fight is Now, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2003, at A20.
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drain nearly $61 billion from the federal treasury in 2003 alone.5 But this
was only the beginning. From 2004 through 2006, the Bush White House
and its congressional allies enacted a series of additional tax cuts as part of
several broader, economic measures.6 Though these cuts were more modest
than those enacted in 2001 and 2003, they came as the human and financial
costs from the war on terror continued to mount. Commentators and critics
questioned how American politicians could consistently ignore the obvious
links between foreign policy and domestic tax law: how could our ostensible
leaders neglect the American tradition of shared wartime sacrifice?
7
To be sure, lawmakers have not always been so oblivious to the price of
conflict and the obligations of wartime fiscal citizenship. Throughout Amer-
ican history most political leaders have recognized that wars entail sacrifices
on the home front as well as the battlefield. Indeed, just a few decades ago,
DeLay's 2003 words and deeds would have been unimaginable. In the
1960s, back when military hawks were also deficit hawks, few leaders
would have been able to justify tax cuts during wartime. As one Republican
lawmaker succinctly explained during the height of the Vietnam conflict, "I
just don't see how we can be hawks on the war and then vote against taxes
to pay for it."'
The contrast between recent and historical wartime tax policy is the sub-
ject of War and Taxes, the provocative and fascinating new book by tax
scholars Steven A. Bank,9 Kirk J. Stark,1° and Joseph J. Thorndike." Using
this contrast as their point of departure, the authors take on the important
and timely question of whether there is any precedent in U.S. history for
cutting taxes in the midst of war. Synthesizing earlier historical scholarship,
the authors provide a rich and thorough reinterpretation of the varying so-
cial, political, and economic conditions that have animated fiscal
policymaking during nearly every major U.S. conflict from the American
5. Jonathan Weisman, $400 Billion-Plus Deficit For Fiscal '03 Seen by CBO, WASH. POST,
June 11, 2003, at A4.
6. See, e.g., Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922;
Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, 120 Stat. 345 (2006);
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418; Working Families Tax
Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, 118 Stat. 1166. The tax-cutting trend did not go unnoticed
by the popular press. Editorial, Another year, another tax cut, and look who's cleaning up: Bush,
Congress complicate IRS code, rewarding their favored interests, USA TODAY, May 17, 2006, at
10A; David R. Francis, Why the rich get the most tax goodies, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 22,
2006, at 15.
7. ROBERT D. HORMATS, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY: PAYING FOR AMERICA'S WARS (2007); E.J.
Dionne, Jr., Editorial, A War Bush Wouldn't Pay For, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2006, at A35; David M.
Kennedy, What Is Patriotism Withcut Sacrifice? N.Y. TImES, Feb. 16, 2003, at WK3; David E. Ro-
senbaum, Tax Cuts and War Have Seldom Mixed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at N17.
8. Norman C. Miller, Legislators Seem Likely To Back Johnson's Plan For 6% Income Tax
Rise: But They May Bar Big Boost In Social Security Levies And Benefits; Delay Seen, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 12, 1967, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
9. Vice Dean and Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
10. Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
11. Director of Tax History Project, Tax Analysts, and Scholar in Residence, University of
Virginia.
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Revolution to the two world wars and up to the present war on terror. Min-
ing the lessons of the past, their goal is to make readers aware of the
complex and challenging circumstances that have prompted wartime Ameri-
can leaders to enact tax hikes.
Although War and Taxes was written in the waning years of the Bush
Administration, its research focus and historical findings remain salient. The
recent economic downturn and the Obama Administration's differing ap-
proach to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have certainly changed the
calculus of wartime tax policy, but the long-term effects of the Bush Ad-
ministration's deficit-inducing tax cuts and war expenditures will be felt for
many years to come. 12 Even more significant, the historical links between
wartime taxation and fiscal citizenship have not only shaped the history of
the modem American state; they are sure to influence future political and
economic developments.
The authors of War and Taxes, of course, are not the first to investigate
the historical relationship between wars and taxes. Scholars have long iden-
tified national conflicts as the crucial catalysts in the creation of effective
tax laws, policies, and administration. From the macrolevel historical soci-
ology of Charles Tilly," Margaret Levi,14 and Michael Mann; 5 to the more
microlevel analysis of British political development; 6 to the recent accounts
of twentieth-century American political and legal history; scholars have
attended to the historical dynamics between wars, taxes, and the politics of
fiscal citizenship. As the economic historian W. Elliot Brownlee has shown,
wars frequently have been pivotal markers in American history, signaling
the collapse of previous political and economic regimes, while ushering in
the emergence of new fiscal orders." The authors recognize this undeniable
12. JOSEPH F. STIGLITZ & LINDA BILMES, THE THREE BILLION DOLLAR WAR: THE TRUE
COSTS OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT (2008).
13. CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, AD 990-1992 (rev. paper-
back ed. 1992); THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE (Charles Tilly ed., 1975).
14. MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE (1988).
15. MICHAEL MANN, THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER 486-90 (1986); Michael Mann, State
and Society, 1130-1815: An Analysis of English State Finances, I POL. POWER & SOC. THEORY 165
(1980).
16. JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH STATE, 1688-
1783 (1990); MARTIN DAUNTON, TRUSTING LEVIATHAN: THE POLITICS OF TAXATION IN BRITAIN,
1799-1914 (2001); MARTIN DAUNTON, JUST TAXES: THE POLITICS OF TAXATION IN BRITAIN, 1914-
1979 (2002).
17. DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND
WAR, 1929-1945 (1999); Mark H. Leff, The Politics of Sacrifice on the American Home Front in
World War 1I, 77 J. AM. HIST. 1296 (1991). BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, FROM THE OUTSIDE IN:
WORLD WAR H1 AND THE AMERICAN STATE (1996).
18. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY (1996); see
also STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS: LINCOLN TO WILSON-THE FIERCE BATTLES
OVER MONEY AND POWER THAT TRANSFORMED THE NATION (2002); SHELDON D. POLLACK, WAR,
REVENUE, AND STATE BUILDING: FINANCING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2009).
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fact, acknowledging that "the history of America's tax system can be written
largely as a history of America's wars."' 9
Yet, what Bank, Stark, and Thorndike have to offer, beyond the lawyer's
and historian's careful eye for the importance of legal doctrine and detail, is
an emphasis on the fragile yet essential discourse of shared sacrifice that has
motivated past wartime tax policymaking. Like other scholars writing about
the history of fiscal policy, ° the authors identify taxation as a fundamental
part of the social contract between states and their citizens. Although they
acknowledge that the sacrifices of war can be borne in many ways, the au-
thors focus on the distribution of tax burdens during wartime as the primary
means for measuring the fairness of shared sacrifice. With this metric, Bank,
Stark, and Thordike attempt to refrain from passing judgment on the recent
Bush Administration's wartime tax policies. Indeed, War and Taxes is not
meant to be a partisan brief against the Republican Party's recent penchant
for tax cuts and deficit spending. Instead, the authors have set out to provide
a judicious, yet ironic, account of the long history of wartime opposition to
tax increases.
In contrast to the conventional wisdom that presumes that wartime patri-
otism has always and everywhere trumped self-interest, the authors contend
that "America's history of wartime taxation is not quite the heroic tale that
many Bush critics seem to imply" (p. xiii). War and Taxes seeks to remind
readers that many previous lawmakers also resisted spreading the burden
and costs of conflict on to the American people. Some of our most cele-
brated historical leaders have sought, as the authors put it, "to delay, deny,
and obscure the trade-off between guns and butter" (p. xiii). In the past,
even during popular wars, "elected representatives have often made room
for self-indulgence, easing burdens for some constituents while raising them
for others" (p. xiii).
Although Bank, Stark, and Thomdike do not claim that America's tradi-
tion of wartime sacrifice is a myth, they maintain that the reality of past
wartime tax policymaking has been complex and contested. Conventional
criticism "misses much of the complexity of American history. Indeed, as a
nation, our commitment to wartime fiscal sacrifice has always been un-
easy-and more than a little ambiguous" (p. xiii).
In their careful efforts to provide a balanced and measured history, how-
ever, the authors inevitably draw attention to the ultimately unprecedented
fiscal policies pursued by American leaders from 2000 to 2006. And herein
lies the irony: War and Taxes provides a valuable and necessary corrective to
the overly romanticized history of wartime sacrifice, but despite its attempts
to bracket the highly partisan and ideological aspects of our recent wartime
19. P. xii. Though War and Taxes uses the end of particular conflicts to frame certain histori-
cal periods, the authors seem cognizant of the constructed nature of wartime. For more on the
temporal aspects of twentieth-century American wars and the contingent effects on legal historiog-
raphy, see Mary L. Dudziak, Law, War and the History of Time (Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch., Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 09-6, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=1374454.
20. See, for example, the essays collected in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN
COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Isaac William Martin et. al. eds., 2009).
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tax policies, the book can also be read as a damning indictment of recent
Republican tax policy. Past leaders may have contested and cloaked the
need for wartime tax hikes, fearing the political consequences or biding time
for more opportune moments. Eventually, however, they all gave in. Only
the Bush Administration and its congressional allies resolutely failed to ac-
cept fiscal responsibilities. Other analysts have been more explicit in their
condemnation of the Bush Administration and ideologically driven tax
cuts, 2' but Bank, Stark, and Thormdike provide a subtle, indirect-and per-
haps even more effective-critique of recent Republican wartime tax
policies.
Undergirding the ideas of shared wartime sacrifice, which are at the
heart of War and Taxes, are even more profound questions about the precise
meaning of the obligations and responsibilities of belonging to a political
community. The vast and rich historical and legal scholarship on civic en-
gagement and national identity has rigorously documented how the
obligations of citizenship,22 especially during wartime, 3 entail heightened
sacrifices among members of a liberal democracy,24 and how those sacrifices
illustrate the greater trust that citizens place in their political leaders during
national emergencies.25 Much less attention, however, has been paid to the
other side of citizenship---the increased responsibilities of political leaders
and policymakers to maintain such trust. If civic responsibilities require citi-
zens to forgo certain activities and at times even surrender life and liberty,
then surely public officials must have a reciprocal duty to ensure that such
sacrifice is shared by all members of a political community. The politics of
fiscal citizenship thus requires the state, as a relatively autonomous actor, to
exercise the discipline and authority to ensure that the price of conflict is
spread evenly across class, region, and even generation.
21. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
NEW GILDED AGE (2008); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (2007); STIGLITZ AND
BILMES, supra note 12.
22. See, e.g., LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND
THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1998); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000). Tax scholars have similarly identified the salience
of paying taxes to fiscal citizenship. See Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Equity versus Efficiency and the U.S.
Tax System in Historical Perspective, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 25 (Joseph J.
Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation,
60 TAX L. REV. 1 (2006); Assaf Likhovski, "Training in Citizenship": Tax Compliance and Moder-
nity, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 665 (2007); Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and
the Civic Virtues of a Tax Return Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53 (2007).
23. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE
MAKING OF THE MODERN AMERICAN CITIZEN (2008); ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, WHY WE FOUGHT:
FORGING AMERICAN OBLIGATIONS IN WORLD WAR 11 (2004); Leff, supra note 17; James T. Sparrow,
"Buying Our Boys Back": The Mass Foundations of Fiscal Citizenship in World War H1, 20 J. POL'Y
HIST. 263 (2008).
24. Precisely measuring individual sacrifice, in the sense of who is worse off because of a
war, is difficult to do, but as War and Taxes shows, American politicians have regularly resorted to
the trope of "shared wartime sacrifice" to marshal support for their policies. See p. 172.
25. On the importance of trust for the functioning of modem political institutions, see gener-
ally TRUST AND GOVERNANCE (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998).
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This Review proceeds in four parts, paralleling the chronological or-
ganization of War and Taxes. It focuses mainly on the book's analysis of the
leading modem American wars, from the Civil War through the global con-
flicts of the twentieth century, up to the recent war on terror. Part I contrasts
the tax policies of the Union and Confederacy during the Civil War to show
how the Lincoln Administration was able to overcome Yankee resistance to
wartime tax hikes to wage a war against a Southern Confederacy that reso-
lutely resisted any type of centralized taxation until, of course, it was too
late.
Part II investigates the two world wars, which together may arguably
represent the "golden age" of shared wartime sacrifice. During both of these
conflicts, Americans seemed willing to embrace the need for greater fiscal
and other sacrifices. They appeared to trust their political leaders, who exer-
cised newly coercive powers, to try to spread the price of conflict evenly
across the populace. Consequently, the two world wars were critical to the
development of the modem American tax regime and the idealized mean-
ings of fiscal citizenship. With the world war experiences as a pivotal
background, Part III turns to an examination of the early Cold War. The con-
trast between the Korean and Vietnam conflicts illustrates the importance of
timing and how acute political leadership, attuned to contemporary social
conditions, can be vital for the making of effective wartime tax policy.
Part IV explores the more recent war on terror, and how it became sub-
sumed by the Republican Party's ideological commitment to tax cuts and
supply-side economics. As the authors of War and Taxes duly note, the im-
mediate post-9/11 period remains too close to our own experiences to permit
objective, detached historical judgment. Still, the recent inability of our po-
litical leaders, on both sides of the aisle, to reconcile the price of conflict
with the need for shared sacrifice demonstrates the sea change in thinking
about tax policy that has occurred over the course of the twentieth century.
This essay concludes with some closing observations about the main schol-
arly contributions of War and Taxes, including how the Bush Administration
may have permanently transformed American thinking about wartime tax
policy and the meaning of fiscal citizenship.
I. THE CIVIL WAR AND A TELLING CONTRAST
The importance of wartime fiscal discipline was perhaps most evident
during the Civil War. Indeed, as the authors show, the contrast between how
the Union and the Confederacy financed the war is instructive of the pro-
found and consequential difference between exercising and abdicating the
responsibilities of fiscal citizenship. Whereas the South stubbornly main-
tained its resistance to spreading the sacrifices of the war, Northern leaders
eventually recognized the need to enact significant tax hikes and other ex-
acting wartime measures.
Initially, both Northern and Southern leaders dodged and disavowed the
need for painful fiscal sacrifices. Each side believed that the conflict would
be short and painless, and such optimism permeated social commentators
1058 (Vol. 108:1053
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and political leaders alike. At the start of the war, leading Northern newspa-
per editors prematurely suggested that business elites throughout the country
would soon come to their senses and help unite the divided nation. The Lin-
coln Administration's first Treasury Secretary, Salmon P. Chase, similarly
contended that "the great body of the citizens, now involved in the calami-
ties of insurrection, will, ere long, become satisfied that order and peace,
and security for all personal and political rights, in the Union and the under
the Constitution, are preferable to disorder and conflict" (p. 35). In his ef-
forts to achieve peace and order, President Lincoln relied originally on
traditional sources of federal revenue to finance what he and his aides be-
lieved would be a short conflict. The tariff, excise taxes, sales of public land,
and the issuance of federal debt remained the main sources of Union re-
ceipts at the beginning of the Civil War.26
Southern leaders, for their part, believed that the righteousness of their
cause would quickly convince the North to end the conflict. Confederate
President Jefferson Davis frequently claimed that the South, like the Found-
ing Fathers, was fighting for the "sacred right of self-government"; nothing
short of the preservation of republican liberty was at stake.21 "[T]he people
of the North are deluded to believe," wrote one Southern periodical, "that it
is in their power to subjugate us and force us back into political union with
them" (pp. 26-27). This "strange infatuation," the editors concluded, "can-
not endure very long" (pp. 26-27). The Confederacy's military leaders
initially seemed to agree, but it did not take long before both sides realized
that the war's duration would be long and its costs steep.
Yet, as the price of the conflict escalated and budget deficits soared on
each side of the Mason-Dixon Line, only Northern leaders were able to
marshal the political will to spread the burdens of wartime sacrifice equita-
bly. Soon after the Confederate victory at Manassas-the seminal July 1861
battle that tested the Union's military and psychological resolve-President
28Lincoln authorized the enlistment of a million men. Congressional leaders,
prompted by the call for greater military service and the need for increased
revenue, responded by raising import duties and enacting a national levy on
land, the first U.S. income tax, and an excise tax on all manufactured goods.
Ensuing resistance to the property tax and the manufacturers' tax under-
29
scored how even some Yankees contested the calls for shared sacrifice.
With Lincoln's leadership, however, Union officials were able to dissipate
such protest. In the process, they helped establish not only the economic
26. SHELDON D. POLLACK, THE FAILURE OF U.S. TAX POLICY: REVENUE AND POLITICS 39
(1996); ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FED-
ERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-1913, at 30-32 (1993).
27. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 310 (1988).
28. Id. at 348. The North referred to the battle of Manassas as Bull Run. Yet, regardless of
the name, the battle tested the mettle of Northern leaders and citizens. Id. at 346-48.
29. Though War and Taxes analyzes the resistance to the manufacturer's tax, the book only
briefly mentions the opposition to the 1861 property tax, perhaps because the measure proved inef-
fective in raising revenue, or perhaps because the constitutional obstacles to its effectiveness may
have rendered it more symbolic than substantive. See HORMATS, supra note 7, at 63-68.
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foundations for the successful financing of the war, but also a model for
subsequent American wartime tax policy.
Eventually, the lack of national administrative capacity to assess and
collect the new Union taxes limited their effectiveness. Little revenue was
collected from the 1861 property or income taxes. Still, Northern leaders
remained resolute in their attention to the distributional impact of wartime
policies. As Union expenditures continued to mount, and as the conscription
of the country's young-and often least well-off-men began, the social
demands for greater financial sacrifice from the affluent became more stri-
dent. Policymakers understood that conscription was a form of sacrifice, a
kind of tax on human capital. 3° The Union responded with a series of reve-
nue acts in 1862 and 1864 that dramatically altered the federal fiscal
landscape. These new tax laws, as Bank, Stark, and Thorndike note, became
a watershed for Civil War financing: "the percentage of tax revenues derived
from internal taxes increased substantially, with income tax receipts more
than tripling. These acts marked the culmination of a radical shift in the sys-
tem of federal financing over a short period" (p. 43).
To be sure, the Civil War tax hikes did not come without resistance. And
War and Taxes provides sufficient evidence-from the protests against the
manufacturers' taxes to the gory violence against the draft-to show the
limits of Yankee patriotism, and thus support the book's thesis about the
ambiguity of wartime sacrifice. Nonetheless, Northern leaders did not aban-
don their responsibilities under the social contract. While many Northern
citizens fulfilled their obligations to the Union as soldiers, taxpayers, and
bondholders, government officials in Washington did their part to hew to the
ideals of shared wartime sacrifice. They may not have extracted as much tax
revenue or fiscal sacrifice as government actors in subsequent American
wars, but they went a long way toward maintaining the faith and trust of
most citizens by spreading the price of conflict among a wider cross-section
of the Northern population.
The striking contrast between Northern and Southern tax policy pro-
vides an even stronger case for the significance of aspiring to an ideal of
shared wartime sacrifice. With its mix of regressive consumption taxes and
graduated income levies, President Lincoln's Republican Party was able to
project the image-if not the reality-that all Northern citizens were sup-
porting the war equally. Although the combination of excise and income
taxes served the dual strategic purposes of raising revenues while containing
inflation, Republican lawmakers were able to employ the rhetoric of patriot-
30. Union conscription was particularly unequal because it permitted the hiring of substitutes
and exemptions for those who were willing to pay $300. For more on how conscription resembled
taxation, see RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL STATE
AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859-1877, at 138 (1990).
31. In fact, the northeast industrial states, led by New York, paid the vast bulk of the Civil
War income taxes. New York alone paid roughly one-third of the tax collected, and seven northeast-
em states plus California collectively paid about 70 percent of income-tax revenues. STANLEY,
supra note 26, at 40-42; JOHN F. WiTTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL IN-
COME TAX 70 (1985).
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ism and shared sacrifice to frame the paying of new robust taxes as a form
of loyalty to the Union. Even Confederate leaders were left astonished by
the extent of Northern commitments. "The most sagacious foresight could
not have predicted," Jefferson Davis bemoaned during the war, "that the
passions of the Northern people would lead them blindly to the sacrifice of
life, treasure, and liberty.
' 31
By contrast, the Confederacy-buoyed by its misplaced military confi-
dence and burdened by its antidemocratic political culture-continued to
resist nearly any form of centralized taxation until it was too late.33 Jefferson
Davis succinctly explained how the early decisions to forgo fiscal sacrifice
created the institutional inertia that eventually crippled the South's wartime
tax policy. "A long exemption from direct taxation by the General Govern-
ment had created an aversion to its raising revenue by any other means than
by duties on imports," wrote Davis, "and it was supposed that these duties
would be ample for current peace expenditure, while the means for conduct-
ing the war could be raised almost exclusively by the use of the public
credit."34 The South did, ultimately, turn to a combination of income and prof-
its taxes, along with levies on a whole host of businesses and commercial
transactions, but with little time to create the administrative capacity needed to
collect these taxes, they proved to be more symbolic than substantive.
In the end, the Civil War experience resoundingly illustrates the incon-
gruity that undergirds the main argument of War and Taxes. Though the
authors seek to emphasize that "the commitment among Northern taxpayers
to the ideal of shared sacrifice was just as uneasy as in the South" (p. 39),
the historical record appears to belie that claim. At the start, Abraham Lin-
coln and his Republican allies may have resisted tax hikes, relying instead
on traditional sources of revenue, but unlike Jefferson Davis, Lincoln and
other Union officials eventually prevailed in raising taxes. They marshaled
the political will to challenge opponents of tax increases and to advance not
only the country's first progressive income taxes, but also the notion that the
politics of fiscal citizenship required the state to spread the costs of war
evenly across class and region.
II. THE TWO WORLD WARS AND THE "GOLDEN AGE" OF
SHARED WARTIME SACRIFICE
If the Civil War provides some mixed evidence in support of War and
Taxes' primary thesis, the two world wars seem to challenge the contention
that American leaders and citizens have been reluctant to embrace a tradi-
tion of wartime sacrifice. Indeed, as the authors acknowledge, World War II
32. 8 THE REBELLION RECORD: A DIARY OF AMERICAN EVENTS 271 (Frank Moore ed., 1865).
33. On how antebellum Southern taxation cultivated an antidemocratic political culture, see
ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY (2006).
34. P. 27. There were other differences, too: while the North relied on a variety of broad-
based taxes to underwrite the war, the South's main reliance on printed money and unsupported
public debt led to disastrous inflation. Id.
April 2010] 1061
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provides the "most compelling example of wartime fiscal sacrifice" (p. xiv).
In fact, if one considers the two world wars as a continuation of one major
global conflagration, as some historians have suggested,35 then the first half
of the twentieth century may appear to be the "golden age" of shared war-
time sacrifice, when a war to make the world "safe for democracy 36 was
followed by the quintessential "Good War."37
A. World War I Fiscal Policy as a Tale of Unintended Consequences
Although Americans were initially divided over U.S. entry into World
War I, once the country officially entered the fray in April 1917 most citi-
zens seemed willing to sacrifice on behalf of the war effort. Public officials,
for their part, did not hesitate to harness wartime patriotism. As part of the
war mobilization effort, lawmakers pushed through a tremendous amount of
unprecedented government intervention into American private life, includ-
ing a new and highly robust wartime tax regime. Still, while state actors
attempted to spread the costs of the conflict among nearly all sectors of so-
ciety, broader economic and political forces often undermined their
objectives.
From the start, national leaders were well aware of the opportunity that
the Great War afforded for stoking nationalistic fervor, or what Herbert
Hoover, the wartime head of the Federal Food Administration, referred to as
"the spirit of self-sacrifice."3 With his calls for "meatless" Tuesdays, and
"wheatless" Wednesdays, President Woodrow Wilson relied heavily on pa-
triotic sentiment and cooperation to encourage food conservation and other
wartime sacrifices.39
Yet, although conservation measures were backed by patriotic coopera-
tion, political pressure was hardly absent during WWI. From conscription to
the limits on free speech to the rise of vigilantism, public and private coer-
40cion were central components in enforcing wartime obligations. In the area
of fiscal policy, government compulsion was more subtle. Americans were
convinced through a sophisticated form of government propaganda that they
35. ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1914-1991, at
21-54 (1996) (1994); c.f Dudziak, supra note 19, at 13-19 (discussing the difficulty of determining
the temporal limits of World War II). But see GERHARD L. WEINBERG, A WORLD AT ARMS: A
GLOBAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR I 1 (2d ed. 2005) (arguing that the two world wars were distinct).
Other scholars have gone further in depicting the continuities of twentieth-century conflicts into one
"Long War." See, e.g., PHILIP BOaBRiTr, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES 24 (2003).
36. MARTIN GILBERT, THE FIRST WORLD WAR: A COMPLETE HISTORY 317 (1994).
37. MICHAEL C. C. ADAMS, THE BEST WAR EVER: AMERICA AND WORLD WAR II 2 (1994).
38. DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 119
(25th anniversary ed. 2004).
39. Id. at 118; see also CAPOZZOLA, supra note 23, at 53-54.
40. CAPOZZOLA, supra note 23, at 21-54. Unsurprisingly, legal historians have focused
considerable attention on the WWI limits to free speech, and the repercussions of these limits on
modem constitutional law. See, e.g., RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE,
THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH (1987); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOT-
TEN YEARS (1997).
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had a patriotic duty to buy government bonds and other public debt. Like-
wise, wartime lawmakers felt pressure to solidify the quasi-voluntary
compliance that undergirded nearly all modem tax systems.4' Treasury offi-
cials did this by trying to build public trust and assuring taxpayers that all
citizens were paying their fair share of war costs.4 2 Not only did politicians
sense that they could raise taxes during the height of war patriotism, taxing
authorities realized that the compliance costs of collecting taxes could be
lower when taxpayers-citizens were more likely to pay to support the war
effort.43 Consequently, the political and economic debates over the mix of
taxes and debt financing became increasingly significant.
At the start of the conflict, the Wilson Administration firmly sought to
divide the costs of the war evenly between current taxes and government
borrowing. In his 1917 war message to Congress, Wilson stated, "so far as
practicable the burden of the war should be borne by taxation of the present
generation rather than by loans." Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo
confirmed that "fifty per cent of the cost of the War should be financed by"
taxation, contending that "one of the most fatal mistakes that governments
have made in all countries has been the failure to impose fearlessly and
promptly upon the existing generation a fair burden of the cost of war."
45
This early desire to balance the war costs was motivated by concerns about
intergenerational and socioeconomic equity.46 The Wilson Administration
thus appeared to be cognizant of its social and ethical obligations to monitor
the distributional effects of war financing.
The steeply progressive tax laws enacted during the war further sup-
ported the notion that political leaders were maintaining their end of the
social contract; that they were attempting to adhere to the ideal of shared
wartime sacrifice. Though the first permanent income tax was in place be-
fore U.S. entry into the war, traditional sources of revenue, namely, import
duties and excise taxes, dominated federal receipts-that is until the war
hastened the arrival of a new fiscal order. By synthesizing previous histori-
cal scholarship, Bank, Stark, and Thomdike remind us that "[d]espite the
41. On the historical importance of "quasi-voluntary compliance," see generally LEvi, supra
note 14.
42. KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 99-101; Ajay K. Mehrotra, Lawyers, Guns & Public Mon-
ies: The U.S. Treasury, World War One, and the Administration of the Modem Fiscal State, 28 LAW
& HIST. REV. 173 (2010).
43. For more on the economic connections between wartime patriotism and lower tax-
compliance costs, see Naomi Feldman & Joel Slemrod, War and Taxation: When Does Patriotism
Overcome the Free-Rider Impulse, in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY, supra note 20, at 138.
44. CHARLES GILBERT, AMERICAN FINANCING OF WORLD WAR 1 84 (1970).
45. Id.; see also WILLIAM G. McADoo, CROWDED YEARS: THE REMINISCENCES OF WILLIAM
G. McADoo 389-90 (1931); DALE N. SHOOK, WILLIAM G. McADOO AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, 1913-1918, at 263-64 (1987); McAdoo Talks Over Loan at Lunch
with Bankers, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1917, at 8.
46. The issue of fiscal policy and intergenerational equity has become increasingly relevant
for present tax scholars and policymakers. See, e.g., Symposium, What Does Our Legal System Owe
Future Generations? New Analyses of Intergenerational Justice for a New Century, 77 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 1135 (2009).
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speed with which the system converted to reliance on 'soak-the-rich' taxa-
tion, the compulsory prong of the fiscal sacrifice campaign was an
unparalleled success" (p. 50).
Indeed, as the war costs escalated, the federal government assiduously
exercised its newfound taxing powers. Top individual marginal income tax
rates soared from a prewar level of 7% to 77% at the height of the conflict;
the percentage of the labor force paying income taxes increased from
roughly 2% to nearly 17%, and monies generated from income and profits
taxes mushroomed from less than 10% of total federal revenues in 1914 to
nearly 60% by the end of the war.47 The tax system that took shape during
the war, thus, had a distinctively redistributive edge. 8 In fact, the effective
tax rate of the nation's wealthiest 1% of households soared from roughly 3%
in 1916 to 15% within two years.49 Accordingly, WWI tax laws occasioned,
as the historian David Kennedy has documented, "a fiscal revolution in the
United States."' Rates would drop dramatically after the war, but the use of
direct and graduated taxes to fund the treasury became a permanent part of
the modem American fiscal state well after the conflict ended.
One reason why lawmakers were able to make such radical changes to
the existing tax system was because of the incredible prevalence of wartime
profiteering. During the war years (1914-1919), American industries in-
volved in military production saw their bottom lines and their stock prices
soar to new heights. The price of Bethlehem Steel stock, for instance, in-
creased seventeenfold, and in 1917 the company paid its shareholders a 200
percent dividend. U.S. Steel and General Motors enjoyed similar gains. And
the Du Pont Company, known colloquially as the "Powder Trust" because of
its monopoly on the military-powder business, saw its already-prosperous
business skyrocket during the war with profits increasing more than ten-
fold."
Although War and Taxes acknowledges the importance of profiteering to
the enactment of a munitions tax and then later a more general excess-
profits levy, 2 the book underestimates the pivotal role that populist and pro-
47. See Mehrotra, supra note 42, at 182, Thle 1.
48. It was redistributive in the sense that it relied mainly on the wealthy for tax revenue,
while the entire country benefited from greater military spending.
49. W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in DOES
ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH, 29, 45 (Joel B. Slemrod ed.,
2000); see also Series Ea 758-772, Federal income tax rates by income group-average rates: 1913-
1960, in HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: MILLENNIUM EDITION (Susan B. Carter et
al. eds., 2006) (showing federal income tax rates by income and year). Effective tax rates refer to the
ratio of a taxpayer's tax liability to income.
50. KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 112.
51. STUART D. BRANDES, WARHOGS: A HISTORY OF WAR PROFITS IN AMERICA 133-34
(1997). While profits and return on equity were increasing rapidly for specific war-related indus-
tries, equity markets as a whole were slumping in real terms, thus fueling the public outcry in favor
of taxing these highly-profitable businesses and their owners and managers. Id. at 136.
52. Pp. 56-57. The 1916 munitions tax was, in fact, a ifle-shot provision aimed squarely at
the Du Pont Company, which was responsible for 90 percent of the revenues generated from this
new levy. BRANDES, supra note 51, at 134-35.
1064 [Vol. 108:1053
Price of Conflict
gressive lawmakers played in exploiting the public outrage over war profi-
teering.53 The book places much greater emphasis, instead, on the functional
aspects of wartime tax policy. It seems to suggest that the muscular WWI
tax system that took shape was the result almost solely of the forces of sup-
ply and demand. The decline in tariff revenue, due to the instability of
international trade, limited the supply of traditional sources of funds, and
the obvious demand for more revenue certainly drove lawmakers to search
for new sources of public monies.
Yet, by focusing on the purely instrumental motives of lawmakers, the
authors seem to ascribe a certain degree of inevitability to the decisions of
contemporaries. In the process, they obscure the historical contingency and
plasticity of the war period. The war emergency, of course, provided the
critical context for building a new fiscal order, but the precise parameters of
that new regime had been hotly contested for decades. Thus during the war
crisis the future of American tax policy was open to multiple possible paths
of development.54 Populist agrarian groups in the late nineteenth century, for
example, had consistently been demanding steeply progressive income and
wealth taxes,5 and several progressive lawmakers from the West and South
attempted to use the war emergency and the wartime tax regime to curb the
growth of corporate capitalism and establish a seemingly more egalitarian
56distribution of wealth. At the same time, business interests, as War and
Taxes shows, resisted the wartime tax hikes, and numerous conservative pol-
icy analysts argued that steeply progressive income and profits taxes would
hinder war mobilization.57 None of these social groups and political leaders
ultimately triumphed, but each in its own way helped shape the outcome of
WWI tax policy, suggesting that the functional demand for revenue was far
from the only determinant of wartime fiscal policy.
The authors, to their credit, do not minimize the contestation that ac-
companied the new wartime tax regime. Uncovering wartime tax protest,
after all, is essential to their main argument. And thus they persuasively
document how Du Pont opposed the munitions tax, and how broader busi-
ness coalitions fought the enactment of the excess-profits levy (p. 55). This
is no small contribution given that many current commentators have more
often assumed than demonstrated that patriotism always muffles tax pro-
tests.55
53. KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 109-10.
54. War and Taxes follows the traditional historiography by contending that WWI was the
culmination of the Progressive Era. P. 49. More recent accounts of Progressivism, however, have
begun to call this periodization into question. See, e.g., MAUREEN A. FLANAGAN, AMERICA RE-
FORMED: PROGRESSIVES AND PROGRESSIVISM, 1890-1920s (2006).
55. ELIZABETH SANDERS, THE ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN
STATE, 1877-1917, at 226-30 (1999); CHARLES POSTEL, THE POPULIST VISION 159-61 (2007).
56. KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 108; Witte, supra note 31, at 81-84.
57. Pp. 54-55; see also Kennedy supra note 37, at 106-13.
58. See sources cited supra note 7.
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War and Taxes makes an equally important contribution to the reinterpre-
tation of the success of the government's wartime bond drives. The Wilson
Administration soon realized that military spending would overwhelm the
initial promise of using progressive taxes to finance half the war. To under-
write the war effort, Treasury Secretary McAdoo turned to a propaganda
blitzkrieg promoting the sale of "Liberty Loans," a variety of below-market
government debt. McAdoo easily resorted to the hyperbole of conflict and
shared sacrifice to mobilize support for Liberty Loans.59 He also enlisted the
services of national celebrities and leading political figures to mobilize sup-
port for Liberty Loans (p. 59).
As a result of McAdoo's actions, scholars have presumed that the WWI
bond drives were an overwhelming success, signifying the tremendous ex-
tent of ordinary Americans' willingness to share in wartime sacrifice. 6° But,
as Bank, Stark, and Thorndike show, investing in these submarket bonds
was hardly a sacrifice when one considers that the interest from these gov-
ernment securities was frequently tax-exempt, and that the appeal of these
tax-exempt investments was heightened by the steeply graduated marginal
tax rates in effect at the time.6' Of course, not all bond investors were mem-
bers of the highest tax brackets, and the "success" of the mass bond drives
may have had more to do with the creation of a new class of American in-
62
vestors, than with reinforcing a sense of civic identity. Ultimately, though,
the combination of steep marginal rates and tax-exempt securities, as War
and Taxes suggests, inured to the benefit of the nation's most affluent own-
ers of capital.
Despite these important scholarly contributions, the Great War proves to
be a difficult example to sustain the book's central claim that "the sentiment
for fiscal sacrifice was strained and contested" (p. 50). Business groups, to
be sure, kept their self-interest in mind as they made "pleas for exemptions
or protests against provisions targeted at them" (p. 50). But American politi-
cal leaders held fast to their wartime responsibilities. They may have sent
mixed signals by simultaneously enacting steeply progressive taxes and
59. McADoo, supra note 45, at 374-79. Reflecting back on his success, McAdoo explained
that "[a]ny great war must necessarily be a popular movement. It is a kind of crusade; and, like all
crusades, it sweeps along on a powerful stream of romanticism." Id. at 374. McAdoo claimed suc-
cess in his financing efforts because he was able to harness-critics would say manipulate-the
emotional potency of war. "We went direct to the people; and that means to everybody--to business
men, workmen, farmers, bankers, millionaires, school-teachers, laborers," McAdoo boasted in his
memoirs. Id. at 378. "We capitalized the profound impulse called patriotism. It is the quality of
coherence that holds a nation together; it is one of the deepest and most powerful of human mo-
tives." Id. at 378-79.
60. Weisman, supra note 18, at 324-25; Gilbert, supra note 44.
61. P. 60. Economic historians have recently documented more precisely the limits of sacri-
fice associated with tax-advantaged liberty loans. Sung Won Kang & Hugh Rockoff, Capitalizing
Patriotism: The Liberty Loans of World War 1 12-13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 11919, 2006).
62. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: How FINANCE TRIUMPHED
OVER INDUSTRY 192-208 (2007); Julia C. Ott, "The Free and Open People's Market": Political
Ideology and Retail Brokerage at the New York Stock Exchange, 1913-1933, 96 J. AMER. HIST. 44
(June 2009).
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issuing tax-favored government debt, but the most adverse aspects of WWI
financing were frequently the result of unintended consequences, rather than
any deliberate attempt by policymakers to conceal or deny the true costs of
the war.63
Consider, for example, the way in which Treasury officials inadvertently
fueled wartime inflation. In its eagerness to sell war bonds, the Treasury
Department encouraged individual investors to use borrowed funds to buy
government securities; it also permitted banks to buy such debt directly.
These actions, together with changes to the nascent Federal Reserve System,
exacerbated inflationary pressures by encouraging private consumption
while at the same time increasing the money supply. 4 As a result, public
borrowing and monetary policy became significant sources of WWI financ-
ing.65 Thus, notwithstanding McAdoo's claims to have learned from the past,
the policies and actions of the WWI Treasury Department were remarkably
similar to the Civil War era. The ease with which political leaders could em-
ploy patriotism to issue government debt was mixed with the unanticipated
results that came from a resort to easy money.
In this sense, World War I seems both to support and undermine the
main argument in War and Taxes. The authors persuasively demonstrate that
not all citizens embraced the American tradition of shared wartime sacrifice.
Yet, political leaders cannot be faulted for trying "to delay, deny, and ob-
scure the trade-off between guns and butter" (p. xiii). Rather than
purposefully abdicating their fiscal responsibilities, WWI lawmakers pur-
sued seemingly rational policies that ultimately frustrated their true
intentions to spread the costs of the war.
B. World War I and the Sustained Commitment
to Shared Wartime Sacrifice
Broader economic and social forces may have undermined the intentions
of WWI policymakers, but many of these public officials learned a great
deal from their experiences in the wartime Wilson Administration. Arthur A.
Ballantine, the Solicitor of Internal Revenue during World War 1,66 helped
defend the constitutionality of the WWI excess-profits tax. 67 After the war,he became a leading member of the New York tax bar,6 but he did not lose
63. KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 99-103; see Mehrotra, supra note 42, at 207-212.
64. KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 102-03.
65. The economic historian Hugh Rockoff has estimated that WWI was financed with rough-
ly 20% from taxes, 20% from money creation, and the remaining 60% from public borrowing. Hugh
Rockoff, Until its Over, Over There: The U.S. Economy in World War 1, in THE ECONOMICS OF
WORLD WAR 1 310, 316 (Stephen Broadberry & Mark Harrison eds., 2005).
66. Melvin I. Urofsky, Ballantine, Arthur Atwood, in DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY
33-34 (John A. Garraty ed., Supp. VI 1980); Mehrotra, supra note 42, at 189.
67. Arthur A. Ballantine, Some Constitutional Aspects of the Excess Profits Tax, 29 YALE
L.J. 625, 627 (1920).
68. Mehrotra, supra note 42, at 220.
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sight of the important work he did during the war to build the administrative
infrastructure of the modem American fiscal state.69
In fact, in 1931, when Ballantine was Assistant Secretary of the Treas-
ury, he reflected on his role at the Bureau of Internal Revenue to argue that
some kind of war-profits tax was an ideal way to raise revenue and temper
the financial appetites of American capitalists. Testifying before the War
Policies Commission, Ballantine maintained that "any plan of war revenue
legislation should include a war profits tax designed to bring into Treasury,
so far as practical, the entire amount of profits due to war.''70 As a longtime
corporate lawyer, Ballantine had expressed his disdain for excessive taxa-
tion, but a war emergency necessitated a different kind of relationship
between citizen-taxpayers and their government. "The need of the govern-
ment for funds to support the war and the general desire," Ballantine
testified, "to eliminate profit from war would both be furthered by" the en-
actment of wartime profits taxes.7'
Although Ballantine did not serve in the WWII Treasury Department,
his sentiments were shared by many officials in Franklin D. Roosevelt's
administration. In what is perhaps the book's most compelling account,
the authors show how the sense of civic engagement triggered by the at-
tacks on Pearl Harbor spurred a second fiscal revolution (p. 93). Indeed,
FDR took the politics of fiscal citizenship to new heights. He not only
forcefully spoke about the need for shared sacrifice; he went so far as to
implement a mass-based income-tax system that has become the bedrock
of the modern American fiscal regime (p. 93). Like their predecessors,
Roosevelt aides understood, especially after the immediate post-Pearl
Harbor panic had subsided, that they needed to bring the pains of a remote
wartime battlefield closer to home. They needed citizens to understand
why self-sacrifice was crucial to the self-preservation of the political
community (p. 97).
There was perhaps no better way for lawmakers to convey the signifi-
cance of self-sacrifice than through the fiscal policies that underwrote the
WWII mobilization effort. Having learned from the WWI experience, New
Deal officials attempted to uphold the government's commitment to realiz-
ing the ideal of shared wartime sacrifice. Treasury Secretary Henry
Morgenthau, Jr. conducted a wartime bond campaign that would have made
McAdoo proud. Treasury's War Finance Committee supervised eight major
bond drives that raised more than $157 billion, with roughly 85 million
Americans investing in war bonds.72 Though the WWII bonds helped pay for
the war and curb inflation, Morgenthau conceded that "60 percent of the
69. Id. at 189.
70. Arthur A. Ballantine, War Policies in Taxation: Statement Before the War Policies Com-
mission (May 20, 1931) (transcript available at the National Archives and Record Administration II,
College Park, MD). An abridged version of Ballantine's testimony was published in The Tax Maga-
zine, July 1931. War Policies in Taxation, 9 TAX MAG. 250 (1931).
71. Ballantine, supra note 70.
72. KENNEDY, supra note 17, at 626; Sparrow, supra note 23, at 266.
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reason" for the bond drive was "to give the people an opportunity to do
something," and "make the country war-minded." He used the bond drives
to "sell the war, rather than vice versa."73
The WWII bond drives may have used the same script as the WWI cam-
paign for Liberty Loans, but when it came to tax policy New Dealers wrote
their own drama. Indeed, the Roosevelt Administration's enthusiasm for the
political use of bonds was surpassed vastly by the incremental manipulation
of tax policy. Even before the United States entered the war, Roosevelt had
asked the American people to put "patriotism ahead of pocketbooks," as he
reminded Congress: "I have called for personal sacrifice," and "[a] part of
the sacrifice means the payment of more money in taxes" (pp. 90-91). FDR
and congressional Democrats backed up this rhetoric with the reinstatement
of a "steeply graduated" excess-profits tax in 1940 (p. 88). Enacted soon
after the adoption of a draft, the excess-profits levy expressed Roosevelt's
desire to fulfill the state's obligations under fiscal citizenship. "We are ask-
ing even our humblest citizens to contribute their mite," FDR declared as
part of his request for the excess-profits tax (p. 88). "It is our duty to see that
the burden is equitably distributed according to ability to pay so that a few
do not gain from the sacrifices of the many" (p. 88).
Once the United States entered the war in 1941, certain political leaders
focused on the need to use broad-based taxes to fund the war in a way that
highlighted the notion of shared sacrifice. Some policymakers, for instance,
argued for a general sales tax, but FDR adamantly opposed what he deemed
to be a regressive method of public financing.7 4 With the President's leader-
ship, Congress settled, instead, on broad-based, graduated income taxes as
the centerpiece of wartime finance. The Revenue Act of 1942, in fact,
marked the start of a new era of fiscal policy, as the dramatic increase in
rates, the decrease in exemption levels, and the reintroduction of tax with-
holding, transformed the early class-based income tax into a mass-based
income-tax system]5 As legal scholar Carolyn Jones has shown, the Treas-
ury Department facilitated this historic transformation by using nearly every
form of popular media-from radio to newspapers to films-to cultivate a
76taxpaying culture .
What was perhaps most significant about the 1942 tax law was how it
sought to balance the war costs between both middle-class and well-off
Americans. The law dramatically cut exemption levels and thus widened the
73. JOHN MORTON BLUM, V WAS FOR VICTORY: POLITICS AND AMERICAN CULTURE DURING
WORLD WAR TWo 17 (1976).
74. Joseph J. Thomdike, "The Unfair Advantage of the Few": The New Deal Origins of
"Soak-the-Rich" Taxation, in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY, supra note 20, at 29.
75. BROWNLEE, supra note 18, at 93-94. For more on the wartime political debates over
federal taxation and the postwar consequences of FDR's opposition to sales taxes, see Lawrence
Zelenak, The Federal Retail Sales Tax That Wasn't: An Actual History and an Alternative History, in
73 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (forthcoming 2010) (copy of manuscript on file with the
author).
76. Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of
the Income Tax During World War 11, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 685, 688 (1989).
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circle of taxpayers, but as Bank, Stark, and Thorndike recount, the changes
were even more profound at the peak of the income scale, where the top
graduated rate climbed to 94 percent, surpassing even the top level of WWI
(p. 97). "Clearly, rich Americans were being asked to pay handsomely," the
authors write, "even as middle-class Americans were struggling to complete
their first round of income tax returns" (p. 98).
FDR relished the "soak-the-rich" aspects of the new tax law. During the
height of the Great Depression, he had singled out the country's wealthiest
citizens as "economic royalists," blaming them for the continued economic
troubles." The war emergency provided Roosevelt with an opportunity to
strike back at these critics in the process of funding the war. FDR himself
later aptly, and perhaps self-servingly, described the 1942 law as "the great-
est tax bill in American history" (p. 96).
It didn't take long, however, for political interests to intrude on the war-
time-tax legislative process. Political dynamics, as historian Mark Leff has
illustrated, quickly allowed certain groups to "domesticate and delimit the
meaning of sacrifice-to define it in terms that reinforced the validity of
their own political interests and claims., 78 No sooner had the ink on the 1942
Revenue Act dried, than Congress returned the following session with an-
other tax bill-one that provided only a fraction of the revenue that FDR
had requested, but was loaded with tax benefits targeted at special interests.
As part of his stinging veto of the 1943 Revenue Act, Roosevelt condemned
the proposed legislation "as not a tax bill but a tax relief bill, providing re-
lief not for the needy but for the greedy" (p. 106). Congress overrode the
president's veto, marking the first time in American history that a revenue
law was enacted without presidential approval.
As War and Taxes notes, the enactment of the 1943 tax law signified a
victory for self-indulgence over shared sacrifice. Yet, taken as a whole, the
WWII tax regime is perhaps the "most compelling example of wartime fis-
cal sacrifice" (p. xiv). For it was during those pivotal years that the United
States not only established the modern mass-based income tax, but also re-
lied more on taxation to extract fiscal sacrifice and fund the war than in any
previous American conflict.79 Part of the reason for this success was FDR's
leadership in opposing seemingly regressive sales taxes and his insistence
on balancing a mass income tax with steeply graduated rates for the wealthy.
This lesson would not be lost on future lawmakers, even as American mili-
tary entanglements became more uncertain in the second half of the
twentieth century.
77. ERic RAUCHWAY, THE GREAT DEPRESSION & THE NEW DEAL: A VERY SHORT INTRO-
DUCTION 106 (2008).
78. Leff, supra note 17, at 1298.
79. Hugh Rockoff has estimated that taxation accounted for nearly half of American wartime
spending, with public borrowing and money creation accounting evenly for the remainder. Hugh
Rockoff, The United States: From Plowshares to Swords 108 in THE ECONOMICS OF WORLD WAR II:
Six GREAT POWERS IN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 81, 108 (Mark Harrison ed., 1998).
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III. THE COLD WAR AND THE IMPORTANCE OF TIMING
Unlike the two total global wars, the conflicts emerging from the Cold
War precipitated a different kind of political dynamic for fiscal policymak-
ing. Whereas earlier conflicts were generally wars officially waged by
Congress, many of the battles of the Cold War were more ambiguous, ex-
ecutive-ordered police actions. As a result, straightforward appeals to
patriotism were often not enough; the timing of wartime tax hikes thus be-
came pivotal. In this sense, catalytic events during the Cold War could
prompt a crisis or emergency mentality, but that sentiment did not always
persist throughout a given conflict or time period.80 By contrasting Cold War
fiscal policies, the authors make a convincing case for the importance of
bold, initial actions, or "strik[ing] while the iron is hot" (p. 141). Indeed,
some of War and Taxes' most instructive historical lessons come from com-
paring American tax policymaking during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.
The Korean conflict, in particular, was built on the legacy created by the
monumental transformations of World War II. Between the end of World
War II in 1945 and the start of the Korean conflict in 1950, the American tax
system went through a modest period of retrenchment. Yet, like nearly all
past conflicts, WWII had a significant "ratchet effect" on government
spending and tax revenues.8' Thus, though top individual rates declined from
a wartime high of 94 percent in 1945 to 82 percent by 1948, they did not
return to their prewar levels, nor did the tax base resort to an exclusive focus
82
on the wealthiest citizens . With real wages rising, most Americans seemed
to be content with the new tax system, and politicians had little reason to
foment antitax sentiments. 3
The new postwar plateau of high taxes and the vivid and indelible
memories of WWII obligations facilitated the calls for a return to patriotic
self-sacrifice and fiscal discipline during the Korean conflict. Waged during
the height of McCarthyism and in the wake of the Chinese Communist Rev-
olution, the Korean conflict came at a time when bipartisan support for
containing communism led both political parties and most Americans to
support a military presence in East Asia. The early support for containing
communism translated into a greater willingness to share in wartime sacri-
fices.M
80. See Dudziak, supra note 19, at 3, 7.
81. SPARROW, supra note 17, at 24-25. For more on the "ratchet effect" with regard to wars
and government spending, see ALAN T. PEACOCK & JACK WISEMAN, THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC EX-
PENDITURE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 52 (rev. 2d ed. 1967); TILLY, supra note 13, at 89.
82. See STATISTICS OF INCOME Div., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME
BULLETIN tabl.23, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soilhistab23.xls; see also W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE,
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON U.S. TAX POLICY TOWARD THE RICH 60-61 (Joel Slemrod ed., 2000).
83. Andrea Louise Campbell, What Americans Think of Taxes, in THE NEW FISCAL SCIOL-
oGY: TAXATION IN COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 20, at 48.
84. WILLIAM STUECK, RETHINKING THE KOREAN WAR: A NEW DIPLOMATIC AND STRATE-
GiC HISTORY (2002).
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Political leaders led the way in reminding Americans about the inextri-
cable link between foreign policy and domestic tax law. Soon after
American troops reached Korea in 1950, the statesman John Foster Dulles,
who at the time was serving as a special advisor to the State Department,
declared that "the time for sacrifice and discipline is here" (p. 113). Empha-
sizing the need to spread the costs of war, Dulles warned that "[m]any now
will risk their lives before the hard battle of Korea is won" (p. 113). As a
result, he continued, "We shall all have to give up some material enjoyments
and be more frugal in our living. There will be fewer automobiles, television
sets, and gadgets to buy and there will be bigger tax bills to pay" (p. 113).
Dulles's words proved to be prescient. Congress responded to the start of
the Korean conflict by reversing the post-WWII reduction in taxes. Taking
advantage of the combination of general prosperity, the political pressures of
McCarthyism, and bipartisan congressional support for the military interven-
tion in Korea, the Truman Administration swiftly transformed a preconflict
tax-relief bill into a major wartime tax increase, the largest in nearly a decade
(pp. 112-16). With top marginal rates soaring to 45 percent for corporations
and over 90 percent for individuals, the 1950 Revenue Act was quickly en-
acted-within forty-five days of being introduced-with overwhelming
bipartisan support (p. 115). Lawmakers followed this substantive show of
shared sacrifice with an excess-profits tax, modeled on similar levies used
during the two world wars.
The concern for equitably spreading the price of conflict dominated
congressional discussions. As one lawmaker aptly put it in 1951, "I think the
boys in Korea would appreciate it more if we in this country were to pay our
own way instead of leaving it for them to pay when they get back" (p. 125).
Committed to not passing the buck to the next generation or even to return-
ing GIs, American leaders forged a tax policy that Bank, Stark, and
Thomdike persuasively depict as becoming "the closest the country has ever
come to a pure 'pay as you go' approach to war financing" (p. 110).
War and Taxes concedes that fiscal policy during the Korean conflict
benefited from some unique historical circumstances. The fear over the
growing spread of communism, which became increasingly frantic with the
demagoguery of McCarthyism, fueled a unique "rally 'round the flag' at-
mosphere" (p. 115). Yet, during the early 1950s, economic and material
prosperity may have trumped politics and foreign policy. American leaders
were able to place the costs of the Korean intervention on to a wide swath of
the current generation not only because they had near unanimous political
support, but also because of flush economic times. The Korean conflict
commenced during the uptick of post-WWII economic growth, during the
early years of the so-called "golden age of American capitalism. 85 With
annual real GDP growth averaging more than 3 percent from 1946--74,
85. EDWARD C. ROYCE, POVERTY AND POWER: THE PROBLEM OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY
93 (2008); R.C. MASCARENHAS, A COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM
9 (2002). For a critique of this view of America's postwar period, see generally THE GOLDEN AGE
OF CAPITALISM: REINTERPRETING THE POSTWAR EXPERIENCE (Stephen A. Marglin & Juliet B. Schor
eds., 1990).
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lawmakers believed that they did not have to choose between guns and but-
ter. 6 The start of what tax scholars have dubbed the "Era of Easy Finance"
allowed American politicians to finance the war and other domestic spend-
. 81
ing with a minimum of home-front sacrifice.
Economic prosperity may have made it easier for American leaders to
demand greater wartime sacrifice, but the timing of the tax increases, as the
authors show, proved to be a crucial trigger. "[A]cting quickly and deci-
sively to raise capital and labor income taxes" was essential for Truman's
success (p. 141). Other wars were equally popular during their earlier
phases, but few politicians demonstrated the steadfast fiscal leadership dis-
played by Truman and his congressional allies.
Whereas President Truman was quick to exploit bipartisan support for
the Korean conflict to pass tax hikes, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson bela-
bored and dodged the moments of financial reckoning. Of course, Vietnam
began as a much more gradual and ambiguous conflict. In fact, during Ken-
nedy's tenure, Vietnam remained in the background as policymakers
88focused on tax cuts as a way to stimulate economic growth and create jobs.
This conventional Keynesian thinking continued into the Johnson Admini-
stration, leading to the 1964 tax cut, which was enacted as part of a
compromise with fiscal conservatives like Wilbur Mills, the powerful chair
of the House Ways & Means Committee, who insisted on spending cuts.8 9
By the mid-1960s, with the war in Vietnam and the recently initiated
war on poverty both in full swing, President Johnson claimed that the nation
could continue its spending spree without increasing taxes. "[T]his nation is
mighty enough, its society is healthy enough, its people are strong enough,
to pursue our goals in the rest of the world while still building a Great Soci-
ety here at home," he announced during his 1966 State of the Union Address
(p. 130). "Time may require further sacrifices. And if it does, then we will
make them. But we will not heed those who wring it from the hopes of the
unfortunate here in a land of plenty" (p. 130). For LBJ, choosing between
guns and butter was a false choice.
Reality, however, soon caught up with Johnson-within a year, time did
require further sacrifices. In 1967, Johnson requested an income-tax "sur-
charge" of 6 percent linked to the increased spending for Vietnam.9° Because
of the social turmoil of the late 1960s, the tax increase, which escalated to
10 percent, was not enacted until eighteen months after Johnson first re-
quested it, and only after he announced that he would not seek re-election.
By then it was apparent that LBJ's misplaced optimism of being able simul-
taneously to provide guns and butter had taken a toll on the budget, as well
86. C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 68 (2004).
87. Id. at 68-70; see also BROWNLEE, supra note 18, at 107.
88. HERBERT STEIN, THE FISCAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA (1969); STEUERLE, supra note
86, at 70-71.
89. JULIAN E. ZELIZER, TAXING AMERICA: WILBUR D. MILLS, CONGRESS, AND THE STATE,
1945-1975, at 201-03 (1998).
90. HORMATS, supra note 7, at 220-23.
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as the president. Near the end of his life, Johnson bitterly recalled how
"[t]hat bitch of a war" had "killed the lady I really loved-the Great Soci-
ety."
9
'
Johnson's critical error, the authors of War and Taxes argue, was his
failure to channel the American public's initial support for the Vietnam War
into shared sacrifice, as Truman had done in Korea. "In the final analysis,"
they write, "Johnson simply placed a greater value on his domestic spending
priorities than he did on the war in Vietnam. Not surprisingly, therefore, he
exhibited extreme reluctance to ask for the wartime sacrifices so common in
previous conflicts" (pp. 142-43). From this acute observation, the authors
conclude that Johnson's "decisions established a historical precedent for
relegating war taxes to the back burner," and thus "by the end of the war in
Vietnam," the traditional American value of shared wartime sacrifice "had
plainly suffered a setback" (p. 143).
War and Taxes' depiction of Johnson's fiscal mishandling of Vietnam is
perhaps the strongest evidence in support of the book's thesis and its at-
tempts to question the recent criticism of the Bush Administration. But if
Johnson's initial reluctance was a mistake, it was a mistake repeated by
George W. Bush, who told Americans after 9/11 to go shopping instead of
asking them to buy bonds or pay higher taxes. And it was a mistake repeated
by Republican lawmakers like Tom DeLay who boldly claimed that tax cuts
were essential to wartime patriotism.92
In the end, though, the comparison between Vietnam and the war on ter-
ror is only half right. Unlike our recent leaders, Johnson ultimately signed
off, albeit grudgingly, on a major tax hike and domestic spending cuts short-
ly after he announced his decision not to seek reelection. By contrast, the
Bush Administration initiated a war on terror but continued to resist ac-
counting for the escalating military costs. To make fiscal matters even
worse, the Republican Party enacted a series of tax cuts, aimed primarily at
the wealthy, that exacerbated the growing federal deficit. In this sense, Pres-
ident Bush may, in fact, be the one setting a historical precedent for not only
relegating war taxes to the back burner, but for having eliminated them
completely from the kitchen of wartime fiscal policymaking.
IV. THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE RELENTLESS ALLEGIANCE TO TAX CUTS
With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent geopolitical domi-
nance of the United States, American military excursions have become even
more complex and ambiguous. But, as Bank, Stark, and Thorndike remind
us, the post-9/11 war on terror remains too close to our own consciousness
for any deep and detached historical perspective. Instead, in the book's final
substantive chapter, the authors briefly chronicle the background, develop-
ment, and legacy of the Bush wartime tax cuts.
91. P. 135; A HISTORY OF OUR TIME: READINGS ON POSTWAR AMERICA 112 ('William H.
Chafe et a]. eds., 7th ed. 2008).
92. See text accompanying supra note 4.
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The authors begin by tracing the origins of the Republican Party's ideo-
logical commitment to tax cuts back to the 1994 Contract with America-a
time of relative peace and prosperity. It was then that Newt Gingrich and
other congressional leaders used the run up to the 1994 midterm election to
campaign, as the authors recount, for "various tax cuts designed to 'create
jobs,' 'enhance wages,' and 'restore the American dream'" (p. 146). Em-
ploying the supply-side economics that had become popular during the
1980s, conservative Republicans argued that tax cuts and limited govern-
ment were the secrets to economic growth (p. 155).
After taking control of Congress, GOP politicians attempted to follow
through on their promises by enacting dramatic tax relief legislation. Presi-
dent Clinton rejected the Republican demands for across-the-board tax cuts,
but enacted some targeted middle-class tax relief measures. Robust eco-
nomic growth, relatively high tax rates, and the benefits of a post-Cold War
"peace dividend" eventually led to a growing budget surplus in the last years
of the twentieth century.93 All of this occurred, of course, absent the impera-
tives of war.
Although the Republican demands for tax cuts were kept at bay during
the Clinton years, a growing surplus soon provided GOP lawmakers with an
easy target. Thus, during the 2000 presidential election, the calls for return-
ing tax dollars to those who earned them became an early and integral part
of the Republican Party's tax-cutting agenda. George W. Bush exploited this
sentiment not only on the campaign trail, but in office: among the first piec-
es of legislation he signed as president was the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 94 a tax cut that was estimated to cost
$1.35 trillion over a ten-year period (p. 149). The era of Bush tax cuts had
begun.
The first Bush tax cut could be attributed to reasonable beliefs about the
proper use of fiscal policy and limited government. Yet, after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, when the nation seemed primed to accept the
sacrifices of war, most observers anticipated an end to the Republican tax-
cutting zeal. Indeed, if the past was any guide, the patriotic and nationalistic
fervor that followed 9/11 should have occasioned a reversal in Republican
thinking about tax policy. "Unlike Pearl Harbor, however, there was almost
no talk in the wake of the September 11 th attacks of a need to increase taxes
to mobilize for war," write the authors (p. 151).
Instead, the Bush Administration responded by relying on American
consumerism to lift the economy out of a recent recession that appeared to
be getting worse after the 9/11 attacks. As Bank, Stark, and Thorndike show,
there were good reasons why the anticipated military response to 9/11
would be different from Pearl Harbor or other previous wars. The contin-
ued-though shrinking-surplus and the unconventional aspects of a war on
terror suggested "that U.S. lawmakers simply did not face the same sense of
93. ROBERT POLLIN, CONTOURS OF DESCENT: U.S. ECONOMIC FRACTURES AND THE LAND-
SCAPE OF GLOBAL AUSTERITY 73-75 (2003).
94. Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38.
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fiscal urgency following the September 11 th attacks as they did in previous
conflicts" (p. 151). This optimism continued even after U.S. troops were
deployed to Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom in Novem-
ber 2001.
Yet, any faith that the Bush Administration was sincerely concerned
about its wartime fiscal obligations was completely shattered in the spring
of 2003. Within a span of a few months, the administration and its congres-
sional allies launched Operation Iraqi Freedom and enacted additional tax
cuts9' that would cost $350 billion over ten years. 96 It was during the debates
over this tax bill that Tom DeLay uttered his now infamous comment about
the importance of tax cuts in the face of war.97 Political leaders were able not
only to fold their actions in Iraq dubiously into their rhetoric about a "war
on terror," they also convinced ordinary Americans of the righteousness of
tax cuts. 9' Throughout the remainder of its tenure, the Bush White House
continued to maintain its focus simultaneously on tax cuts and military
spending for the war on terror, despite the tenuous link between 9/11 and the
invasion of Iraq. The traditional trade-off between guns and butter no longer
seemed to apply.
The Republican Party's relentless allegiance to tax cuts, even after the
deployment of troops in two distant lands, is exceedingly difficult to recon-
cile with the historical record-and is just one reason why many people
continue to contest the coherence of a "war on terror." Past leaders such as
Presidents Lincoln and Johnson, as War and Taxes persuasively illustrates,
did initially dodge and disavow the need for fiscal discipline in the midst of
war, but they eventually conceded their early errors and took responsibility
for the mounting wartime costs. They ultimately agreed that fiscal citizen-
ship meant that the state had a reciprocal obligation to its constituents-an
obligation to ensure that the total price of conflict was distributed fairly
among all citizens.
CONCLUSION
War and Taxes makes an important contribution to the literature on the
history of American tax policy. By uncovering the complex and contested
circumstances surrounding past wartime fiscal policy, the book provides a
badly needed corrective to an overly romantic view of U.S. history. The
standard narratives of American wartime tax policy-and the recent social
commentary that has relied on these conventional accounts-have presumed
too frequently that patriotism has naturally and inexorably always triumphed
95. Weisman, supra note 5.
96. Business Digest, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2003, at Cl.
97. See The Budget Fight is Now, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
98. For more on how ordinary Americans were convinced about the need for tax cuts, see
generally Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American
Mind, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 15 (2005); Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Abandoning the Middle: The
Bush Tax Cuts and the Limits of Democratic Control, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 33 (2005).
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over self-interest; that American citizens and their leaders have been ready
and willing to embrace a tradition of wartime shared sacrifice. In some
ways, this perspective is, indeed, an idealistic picture of the past. The au-
thors, therefore, are correct to caution against contrasting recent policy with
a "cardboard cutout version of an imagined past" (p. xiii).
Received wisdom is often overly simplified. But it is also sometimes ac-
curate. Although the history of wartime taxation has been complex and
contested, there has undeniably been a strong tradition of exacting shared
sacrifices during wartime. Recent and current tax policy seems to deny the
significance of this tradition. The Bush Administration not only squandered
opportunities to harness American patriotism for the sake of wartime sacri-
fice, it also abdicated any sense of fiscal accountability throughout its
leadership. The Obama Administration, for its part, has been confronted by
a historic financial crisis, a deep recession, and material changes to the war-
time conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan-all this has altered the priorities of
wartime fiscal policymaking.
Nonetheless, even President Obama has made only limited gestures to-
ward the American tradition of shared wartime sacrifice. The Democratic
Party's penchant for targeted "middle-class" tax cuts and the Obama Ad-
ministration's pledge to soak only the rich with new tax hikes have replaced
the Republican commitment to across-the-board tax reduction.99 Likewise,
discussions of moving the focus of American military might from Iraq to
Afghanistan have only solidified the seeming permanence of the war on ter-
ror.'0° Consequently, foreign policy and domestic tax law are still often
treated as mutually exclusive areas of policymaking. It appears as if the
Bush years not only have been an historical anomaly, but that they have also
operated as a critical juncture or transformative moment in American politi-
cal and economic development, creating a new mindset about wartime
taxation and the politics of fiscal citizenship.
Bank, Stark, and Thorndike recognize that the Bush-era tax cuts "plainly
constitute an extraordinary episode in the history of American war finance"
(p. 164). Veering from their initial thesis, the authors to their credit ac-
knowledge the "inescapable fact" that "the idea of consciously and
aggressively reducing federal tax revenues while simultaneously pursuing a
war abroad is new to the American experience" (pp. 164-65). Faced with
this challenge, the authors are forced to explain the apparent gestalt shift in
wartime tax policy. The concluding chapter of War and Taxes thus serves as
something of a deus ex machina, summoned to help resolve the difficulty
of reconciling the Bush Administration's actions with the historical record.
The authors suggest that the recent inversion in the politics of wartime taxa-
tion and fiscal citizenship may be explained by broader, structural
99. Jackie Calmes, Obama's Pledge to Tax Only the Rich Can't Pay for Everything, Analysts
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2009, at A10.
100. ANDREW BACEVICH, THE LIMITS OF POWER: THE END OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
187-89 (2009); Elisabeth Bumiller, With Boots in Iraq, Minds Drift to Afghanistan, N.Y TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2009, at Al; Yochi J. Dreazen and Naftali Bendavid, Gates Gives Obama Afghan Troop
Request, WALL. ST. J. Oct. 8, 2009.
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transformations in economic, political, and social conditions; namely, the
growing insignificance of inflation, the marginalization of deficit concerns,
and the end of the draft (pp. 168-74).
Despite these incongruous yet highly plausible explanations, it is diffi-
cult to come away from War and Taxes' balanced, thorough, and ostensibly
nonpartisan account without thinking that the Bush Administration has
thrust us into a new era of wartime tax policymaking. Earlier administra-
tions and Congresses may have had momentary lapses of resolve, but today
we seem to have entered a new age of sustained fiscal irresponsibility-a
new age when too many political leaders cling to the dubious claim that
"nothing is more important in the face of war than cutting taxes" (p. 155).
